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Fiscal Policies 
Jacob A. Frenkel 
This introduction provides a reader’s guide to the book. It contains a 
summary of each chapter and an outline of the discussants’ comments. 
In  chapter 2,  Malcolm D.  Knight  and Paul R.  Masson  apply  an 
investment-savings framework to the analysis of the effects of  fiscal 
changes in the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and 
Japan. They start the analysis by noting that the sharp rise in the U.S. 
budget deficit from 1981 to 1985, and the contemporaneous moves to 
fiscal restraint in Germany and Japan, constitute an important shift in 
the pattern of  fiscal positions among the largest industrial economies. 
During this same period, the international economy has been charac- 
terized by three “stylized  facts”: the persistently high  level of real 
interest rates in international financial markets; the sharp rise in  the 
current account deficit of the United States and the increased surpluses 
of Germany and Japan; and the sustained appreciation in the real ef- 
fective exchange rate of the U.S. dollar. Knight and Masson examine 
the extent to which the three major developments that characterize the 
international economy over the years 1981  -85  may be related to these 
fiscal shifts. 
Their analysis emphasizes the basic point that the fiscal changes of 
recent years constitute major disturbances to net  saving and invest- 
ment flows. Thus, following the work of Laursen and Metzler, Sachs 
and Wyplosz, and Frenkel and Razin, they model the overall current 
account in terms of intertemporal decisions regarding private saving 
and investment and the government fiscal deficit. Specifically, they 
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show that,  if  “full  Ricardian equivalence”  of  government debt and 
taxes does not hold, then  the three stylized facts referred  to above 
are yielded by a simple neoclassical model in which two large countries 
borrow and  lend in  an integrated world capital market.  The reason 
for this result is readily discernible. Unless changes in the stock of 
government debt leave private wealth unaltered, an autonomous in- 
crease in, for example, the U.S. fiscal deficit means that the United 
States must use more (or provide less) of the flow of net savings vis- 
8-vis the rest of the world, so that the world interest rate has to rise. 
In order for the increased flow of foreign savings to enter through the 
capital account, the U.S. current account must be pushed into deficit 
via an appreciation of the real exchange rate and a loss of international 
competitiveness. 
Given these implications of simple neoclassical theory, several in- 
teresting empirical questions arise: Is “Ricardian equivalence”  con- 
sistent with the data for major countries? If  not, what fraction of the 
overall movements  in real interest rates and exchange rates can we 
attribute to changes in fiscal policy as opposed to other factors? To 
address these questions, Knight and Masson specify and estimate an 
empirical model, based on simple theory, in which the determinants of 
both stocks of  private sector assets and flows of private saving are 
specified so as to allow any proportion of government debt to be viewed 
by the private sector as part of its net wealth. Parameter estimates 
obtained  from annual data over the period  1961-83  for the United 
States, Germany, and Japan suggest that, althoughfulf Ricardian equiv- 
alence does not  hold, a substantial fraction-perhaps  nearly  half-of 
any increase in public sector saving is likely to be offset by induced 
declines in private saving at unchanged real interest rates. 
Simulation experiments with the model are used to analyze several 
important policy issues.  First, what is the effect of an autonomous 
reduction of  the fiscal deficit in each of  the three largest industrial 
countries separately? If the results for the United States are taken as 
an example, the simulations suggest that a permanent reduction in the 
fiscal deficit of  1%  of  U.S. capacity output produces a large decline 
(nearly 3 percentage points) in U.S. (and world) real interest rates and 
that this effect will appear quite quickly after the fiscal change is im- 
plemented. The simulations also suggest that such a fiscal change would 
lead to a large initial depreciation in the U.S. dollar, but its real value 
could be either above or below the preshock level in  the long run, 
depending (among other things) on the degree to which the private 
sector regards changes in the stock of domestic government debt as 
part of its net wealth and on the interest responsiveness of private 
saving and investment. Thus the model suggests that fiscal shifts may 
cause the real exchange rate initially to “overshoot”  the value that 
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It is, of course, quite clear that changes in the pattern of fiscal po- 
sitions, taken in isolation, can provide only part of the explanation for 
the movements in real interest rates, exchange rates, and current ac- 
count positions of  the  largest  industrial  economies over the period 
1981-85.  Relative shifts in the degree of monetary restraint were ob- 
viously important, particularly at the beginning and end of this period; 
cyclical effects were certainly a factor, especially in 1984, when U.S. 
output growth was unexpectedly rapid. These monetary and cyclical 
factors have intentionally  been  excluded from this model.  Thus the 
question arises whether the neoclassical effects of fiscal shifts that are 
emphasized by the analysis account for a large proportion of the changes 
that actually took place or whether other factors have been predomi- 
nant. The second set of simulation experiments assesses the extent to 
which the pattern  of fiscal shifts that has been observed among the 
largest industrial economies since 1981 helps to explain the direction 
and magnitude of the net movements in  interest rates and exchange 
rates during this period. 
The simulation results suggest that, excluding cyclical and monetary 
effects, fiscal changes like those that occurred during the period 1981- 
85 might have increased world real interest rates by nearly 4 percentage 
points relative to what they would otherwise have been, and the U.S. 
dollar is also simulated to increase  substantially.  While fiscal shifts 
appear to be quite important quantitatively in the net changes in interest 
rates, exchange rates, and current accounts, they do not help to explain 
their timing. Like other models that focus on fiscal effects, the model 
analyzed by Knight and Masson suggests that the fiscal changes oc- 
cumng  from 1981 onward, if correctly anticipated, should have induced 
a large initial appreciation of the U.S. dollar followed by a subsequent 
depreciation, whereas its value rose nearly continuously from 1980 to 
early 1985. Part of the explanation for this difference in timing may be 
shifts in the degree of monetary restraint and cyclical effects that are 
excluded from the analysis. It may also be that the extent of the increase 
in the U.S.  fiscal deficit during the first years of the period was con- 
sistently underestimated by market participants, leading to repeated 
fiscal “surprises.” 
In discussing  Knight and  Masson’s  paper,  Olivier Blanchard and 
Rudiger Dornbusch address the theoretical as well as the empirical 
issues. Both discussants elaborate and clarify the channels of the in- 
ternational transmission mechanism highlighting the critical role that 
interest rates play in intertemporal modeling of the open economy. In 
this context a special emphasis should be given to the distinction be- 
tween short run and long run and between transitory and permanent 
policies. In commenting on the empirical applications, the discussants 
focused on the authors’ specification of the saving and the investment 
functions that are central to the forward-looking character of the model. 4  Jacob A. Frenkel 
In  the third  chapter Warwick  J. McKibbin  and Jeffrey  D.  Sachs 
analyze the question of coordination of monetary and fiscal policies in 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
They note that discontent with the functioning of the world monetary 
system has led to many proposals for international monetary reform. 
These proposals range from enhanced consultations under the current 
regime of floating exchange rates to a regime of fixed exchange rates, 
as proposed by Ronald McKinnon. The authors examine the implica- 
tions of  several alternative monetary arrangements for fiscal policy in 
the world economy. In particular they focus upon two issues, first, the 
effects of alternative monetary arrangements on the international trans- 
mission of fiscal policy, and second, the implications of the alternative 
regimes for strategic aspects of fiscal policymaking. 
They consider four alternative monetary regimes. The first is a float- 
ing  exchange rate  regime in  which  countries  independently choose 
monetary and fiscal policies. The second is a dollar standard in which 
non-U.S. countries intervene in their domestic money markets to main- 
tain a fixed exchange rate pegged to the U.S. dollar. The third regime 
is that proposed by Ronald McKinnon, in which each country inter- 
venes in its domestic money market to maintain a fixed exchange rate 
with  the  additional  constraint  that the weighted  sum of  the  money 
stocks remains fixed. In the fourth regime they again assume a fixed 
exchange rate but with the weighted sum of world money stocks no 
longer fixed but determined cooperatively by the countries. 
McKibbin and Sachs use a static Mundell-Fleming model to derive 
multipliers for the international transmission of fiscal policy under each 
regime. They find that under a fixed exchange rate, fiscal policy can 
be negatively transmitted. To quantify the channels of transmission the 
authors use the McKibbin-Sachs Global (MSG) model, which is a gen- 
eral equilibrium macroeconomic simulation model of the world econ- 
omy. They find that under a flexible exchange rate a fiscal expansion 
in  one country  raises output in  the rest  of  the  world, raises world 
interest rates, and appreciates the currency of the expanding country. 
Under a dollar standard, however, a fiscal expansion in the U.S. is 
negatively transmitted to the other regions because of an endogenous 
contraction of monetary policy in  these regions that is  necessary  to 
stabilize their currencies. A fiscal expansion outside the United States, 
on the other hand, is positively transmitted to the United States since 
under a dollar standard the U.S.  has no obligation to contract its money 
supply. The McKinnon regime removes this asymmetry, so that a fiscal 
expansion in each region is negatively transmitted to the other regions. 
The second part of the chapter deals with the strategic implications 
of fiscal policy under the alternative monetary regimes. Again the au- 
thors use the static Mundell-Fleming model to illustrate the key issues 
involved. In the case of an inflation shock under a floating exchange 5  An Introduction to International Aspects of Fiscal Policies 
rate, they show that each country attempts to appreciate its currency 
in order to reduce domestic inflation. In the symmetric Nash equilib- 
rium, the result is no change in any exchange rate, but an inefficiently 
low level of output and high fiscal deficits in all countries. By imposing 
a fixed exchange rate (assuming symmetry of countries and shocks and 
an optimally chosen world money stock), McKibbin and Sachs illus- 
trate a case where the monetary regime removes the inefficiency of 
policymaking, even when fiscal policies are still chosen noncoopera- 
tively. 
Techniques of dynamic game theory are then applied to the MSG 
model in an attempt to consider the issues in a more general framework. 
The authors first calculate a set of cooperative policy rules under flex- 
ible exchange rates as well as rules where each country chooses its 
fiscal policy noncooperatively under each of the alternative regimes. 
They then consider the short-run response to a global inflationary shock 
and find that the McKinnon  rule  leads to an outcome close to the 
cooperative equilibria. 
In an attempt to measure the average operating characteristics of 
each of the regimes when governments are choosing fiscal policy stra- 
tegically, McKibbin and Sachs add stochastic shocks to the behavioral 
equations for aggregate demand, prices, and money in the United States 
and the rest of the OECD. They next calculate the stochastic steady 
state variances of  various macroeconomic targets (e.g., output, infla- 
tion, current account) assuming that shocks are independently distrib- 
uted.  In this case the McKinnon rule performs poorly  (in terms of 
higher variance of target variables) relative to the noncooperative float- 
ing regime and relative to the cooperative regime. In the cooperative 
regime the policy response is a form of  managed exchange rates. Fi- 
nally, the authors consider a case in which money velocity shocks are 
negatively correlated across countries. In this case, the McKinnon rule 
performs extremely well. 
As  is  generally  the  case in the discussion  of  exchange regimes, 
McKibbon and Sachs find that the choice of the monetary system is 
crucially dependent upon the source and nature of the shocks hitting 
the world economy. In this chapter they show that the monetary regime 
also has important implications for the transmission of fiscal policy in 
the world economy and for the nature of the strategic games played 
by fiscal authorities. However, fixed exchange rates do not necessarily 
eliminate the inefficient equilibria that can occur when fiscal authorities 
behave noncooperatively. 
In his comments on the McKibbin and Sachs chapter, William H. 
Branson provides a guide to the MSG model and helps to place the 
McKibbin-Sachs paper within the broader body of research on coor- 
dination of macroeconomic policies. He notes that the research strategy 
followed by McKibbin and Sachs is a simulation study that takes the 6  Jacob A. Frenkel 
empirical parameters and the institutional framework as given. Branson 
suggests that a useful extension would lead to the understanding of the 
design of institutions and regimes that offer policymakers the incentives 
to coordinate. 
Commenting on the same paper,  Robert P.  Flood  starts by listing 
some caveats concerning the simulation exercise. He then proceeds to 
discuss the rationale underlying the specification of the loss function 
used by the authors, and finally he raises some methodological issues 
concerning the use of the model for policy evaluation. 
In the fourth chapter Willem H. Buiter uses a small analytical two- 
region model (the United States and the rest of  the industrial world) 
to analyze three issues concerning international economic interdepen- 
dence and macroeconomic policy coordination that have been central 
to recent academic and official discussions. The formal model is the 
two-country Mundell-Dornbusch model, with a floating exchange rate, 
perfect international capital mobility, rational expectations in the for- 
eign exchange market, and sluggish adjustment of gross domestic prod- 
uct (GDP) deflators in the short run. The long-run properties of the 
model are classical: Output is at its exogenously determined capacity 
level; a country’s inflation rate equals the proportional rate of growth 
of its money stock; and real competitiveness is independent of mon- 
etary policy.  Expansionary fiscal policy at home and contractionary 
fiscal policy abroad cause a long-run real exchange rate appreciation, 
as do adverse shocks to domestic capacity output and positive shocks 
to foreign capacity output. Expansionary fiscal policy in either region 
and negative shocks to capacity output in either region will raise the 
real interest rate equally in both regions. 
Most of Buiter’s analysis is conducted on the assumption that the 
two regions have identical structures, which permits considerable sim- 
plification in the algebraic analysis and allows for a very transparent 
graphical description of the adjustment dynamics. 
The three policy issues raised are: (1) What should be the monetary 
and/or fiscal response in the rest of the industrial world to a tightening 
of U.S. fiscal policy and what should be the U.S. monetary response? 
(2) What should be the monetary and/or fiscal response in the United 
States and in the rest of the industrial world to a “collapse of the U.S. 
dollar”? The paper emphasizes the importance of  determining the causes 
of such a “hard landing” for the U.S. dollar, as the appropriate policy 
responses are very sensitive to this.  (3) What should be the macro- 
economic policy response both in the United States and in the rest of 
the industrial world to a disappointing real growth performance? Again 
the correct identification of the reason(s) for this disappointing perfor- 
mance is shown to be crucial. 
A unilateral U.S. fiscal contraction is shown to cause a temporary 
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nominal and real value of the dollar. Merely preventing the nominal 
exchange rate from adjusting through nonsterilized foreign exchange 
market intervention does not reduce the magnitude of the global reces- 
sion or alter the real long-run adjustment that takes place in response 
to the  U.S.  fiscal contraction.  It would redistribute the  unchanged 
global unemployment and excess capacity burden toward the United 
States and away from the rest of the industrial world. If  the United 
States (but not the rest of the industrial world) sterilized its foreign 
exchange losses when fixing the nominal exchange rate, the effect on 
global and regional economic activity is ambiguous, as there now are 
two policy changes (contractionary U. S. fiscal policy and expansionary 
U.S.  monetary  policy) working in opposite directions. The long-run 
effects of these policy changes are independent of the monetary policy 
and the exchange rate regime. In the long run, a U.S. fiscal contraction 
lowers  real  interest  rates  at home  and  abroad  and  improves  U.S. 
competitiveness . 
A compensating fiscal expansion in the rest of the industrial world 
would permit the desired traverse to a better level of U.S.  competi- 
tiveness without a global slump, but it would be inconsistent with a 
reduction  in the global real interest rate.  A  combined expansionary 
monetary policy move in both regions can help achieve the desired 
improvement in U.S. competitiveness and reduction in the world real 
interest rate at full employment. These monetary stimuli could but need 
not be  permanent  increases in the rate of  money growth.  Once-off 
credible open market purchases raising the levels of the nominal money 
stocks suffice. 
Buiter argues that if a sudden drop in the dollar reflects the bursting 
of a speculative bubble, there are no obvious monetary and fiscal policy 
implications. Collapses reflecting perceived  changes in fundamentals 
do in general call for stabilization policy responses. A “direct currency 
substitution” shift in liquidity preference out of the dollar calls for open 
market sales in the United States and open market purchases in the 
rest of the industrial world. The adverse consequences of the emer- 
gence of a real risk premium on the return from foreign investment in 
the United States can be neutralized by raising the rate of taxation by 
the United States on interest income from abroad or by appropriate 
monetary and/or fiscal responses. 
If a slowdown in global economic activity reflects an adverse global 
aggregate supply shock, demand-reducing measures are called for in 
both countries to avoid stagflationary consequences. If deficient private 
effective demand is the culprit, appropriate fiscal and/or monetary stim- 
uli are called for. 
In the final section of the chapter Buiter discusses and qualifies the 
activist policy conclusions derived from the formal analysis. The al- 
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monetary and fiscal policy is not an obstacle, as it occurs only in a 
very restricted and implausible set of  models. Uncertainty about the 
nature of the true model greatly complicates optimal policy design but 
does not affect the superiority, in principle, of contingent (or feedback) 
policy rules.  Credibility problems  (the reversibility  of  expansionary 
“temporary  fiscal stimuli”;  the ability to commit the monetary au- 
thority  to a policy of not attempting to use inflationary surprises to 
stimulate output or amortize non-index-linked government debt in real 
terms) are potentially  serious but have political and institutional so- 
lutions. 
Commenting on Buiter’s analysis, Maurice Obstfeld questions the 
assumptions that policymakers know precisely the nature of disturb- 
ances and that the effects of  policy actions are readily predictable. 
Obstfeld notes that uncertainties about the nature of shocks and the 
effects of  policies preclude sophisticated fine tuning and yield instead 
simple policy rules.  In this regard he compares the consequences of 
purely floating exchange rates and fixed exchange rates, highlighting 
considerations of  risk sharing. 
Stephen J. Turnovsky’s comments on Buiter’s analysis deal with the 
specification of the model, the effects of anticipated future shocks, and 
strategic aspects of the analysis. Turnovsky concludes his comments 
by advocating the use of  an alternative optimizing model. The latter 
extension is especially important since, as Turnovsky notes, the re- 
placement of the postulated model by an optimizing model provides 
the basis for an analysis of the welfare implications of policies. 
In the fifth chapter David Backus, Michael Devereux, and Douglas 
Purvis provide a positive theory of  fiscal policy in open economies. 
They first note that when consumers have infinite horizons, the timing 
of taxes has, to a first approximation, no effect on the allocation of 
resources.  The question arises: Why do governments appear consis- 
tently to set taxes so that both tax rates and tax revenues vary directly 
with current income? In answering this question, the authors argue 
that consumers with finite lives (and no bequest motive) provide an 
incentive for governments to redistribute income over time in order to 
smooth utility across generations. This argument for income-smoothing, 
made  in  the context  of  an overlapping-generations  economy, has a 
number of implications for the dynamics of aggregate time series. 
First, the government in a small, open, pure-exchange economy can 
exploit its access to long-term capital markets to smooth fluctuations 
in  private agents’ income  streams.  In this case government deficits 
coincide exactly with balance of  trade deficits. 
Second, when goods are storable, they provide an alternative method 
for smoothing income.  In an open economy, however,  consumption 
and investment decisions  are separable; the exact identity between 9  An Introduction to International Aspects of Fiscal Policies 
government deficits and trade deficits is broken, although they remain 
correlated. 
Third, in a world composed of many economies there are no policy 
conflicts if  all countries are small in the sense of being price-takers. 
The equilibrium that results when each country smooths its own income 
stream is efficient from a global viewpoint. 
Finally, the theory implies that tests of the Ricardian equivalence 
theorem based on aggregate time series have no power: if the govern- 
ment redistributes income optimally, aggregate consumption behaves 
as if it were chosen by a single, infinitely-lived household. 
In commenting on the Backus, Devereux, and Purvis paper, Stanley 
Fischer provides an intuitive explanation of the results and discusses 
their relevance to “real world” fiscal policy. He notes that in general 
the correlations among endogenous variables depend upon the under- 
lying shocks. In this regard, Fischer points out that the analysis in the 
paper is especially applicable to situations in which the disturbance is 
a transitory productivity shock. 
Commenting on the same paper,  Kenneth  Rogoff discusses  some 
extensions and elaborations of the analysis. He points out that there 
are many plausible reasons why the Ricardian equivalence may not 
hold: finite lives, tax distortions, imperfect capital markets, uncertain 
fertility, and the like. Although many different reasons may imply that 
the timing of taxes “matters,”  they do not imply the same positive or 
normative conclusions. Rogoff notes that it would be worthwhile to 
examine the sensitivity of the main results of the paper to alternative 
assumptions underlying the departure from the Ricardian equivalence. 
In the sixth chapter Alan C. Stockman analyzes the effects of fiscal 
policies in an open ecQnomy when international financial markets are 
well enough developed that consumers can use them to hedge against 
the risk of adverse changes in future government policies. When con- 
sumers choose portfolio allocations to combine risk and return in an 
optimal fashion, they can be interpreted as hedging against risks due 
to underlying disturbances to the economy. In equilibrium, both port- 
folio allocations and the returns on financial assets reflect these un- 
derlying disturbances. 
Stockman notes that disturbances to the economy may come not 
only from nature (as shocks to production, population, or tastes), but 
also from government policies. (Alternatively, changes in government 
policies may be treated as endogenous responses  to underlying dis- 
turbances from nature.) Optimal portfolio diversification entails hedg- 
ing risk due to possible future changes in policies. Some examples of 
this phenomenon are common: consumers may hold real assets (such 
as housing) as a hedge against inflation (monetary policy),  or firms 
engaged in international trade may hedge their assets against the pros- 10  Jacob A. Frenkel 
pects of exchange controls by diversifying across countries and holding 
less in assets with a greater risk of being controlled. Similarly, equity 
prices (such as prices of oil company stocks) theoretically reflect risks 
of  changes in the corporation income tax, investment tax credits, or 
other taxes (such as fees on imported oil). 
The effects of actual changes in government policies depend on the 
assets that were available to consumers and firms when their portfolio 
choices were made and on their expectations about the probabilities 
of various changes in policies. Stockman’s paper, which assumes that 
people have rational expectations, examines the effects of fiscal policies 
in an open economy when there are complete international financial 
markets and contrasts the results with the effects of the same policies 
when international financial markets are more limited. These thought 
experiments are helpful in evaluating the impact of the rapid devel- 
opment of domestic and international financial markets currently taking 
place. The effects of government policies may be quite different in the 
emerging world of sophisticated asset markets than in past situations 
with more limited opportunities for trade in financial assets. 
The first example in Stockman’s paper involves a change in govern- 
ment spending in a large open economy (part of a two-country world) 
with two goods. Government expenditure is assumed to be productive 
in reducing real transaction costs associated with consuming the good 
that is exported by the domestic country, and lump-sum taxes are varied 
to maintain a balanced budget. Results are obtained in the neighborhood 
of  the socially optimal level of  government spending.  The analysis 
shows that, in the absence of any international financial markets, changes 
in domestic government spending have indeterminate effects on inter- 
national trade and domestic consumption of the importables. But the 
indeterminacies vanish  in the presence  of  complete international fi- 
nancial markets, and the effects of a change in government spending 
on domestic imports may be reversed. 
The second example concerns the effects of temporary changes in 
distortionary taxes in a simple two-period model with two countries. 
The domestic government is assumed to vary spending (on a public 
good that enters utility in an additively separable way) with changes 
in revenue from a tax on domestic consumption.  In contrast to the 
results obtained when there are only limited international financial mar- 
kets, a temporary increase in the consumption tax in the presence of 
complete asset markets reduces current domestic consumption but leaves 
all future prices and quantities unchanged. Complete financial markets, 
therefore,  alter the  dynamic responses  of  the domestic and foreign 
economies to changes in domestic fiscal policy. In addition, complete 
financial markets remove indeterminacies regarding the effect of higher 
domestic taxes on foreign production: domestic and foreign production 
move in the same direction in response to a change in domestic taxes. 11  An Introduction to International Aspects of  Fiscal Policies 
The third example concerns the international effects of changes in 
government  budget  deficits brought  about by  changes  in  lump-sum 
taxes, in a model without Ricardian equivalence. The paper adds com- 
plete  international financial markets to a two-country  model of  the 
world economy and studies the international effects of changes in def- 
icits. When international financial markets are very limited, a deficit 
raises domestic wealth and aggregate demand but may reduce foreign 
wealth and demand.  In contrast, domestic and foreign wealth must 
initially change in the same direction when there are complete inter- 
national financial markets. In the long run, however, the results are 
independent of the menu of assets that may be traded. 
Stockman concludes the analysis by noting that complete interna- 
tional financial markets alter the international effects of fiscal policies 
because they eliminate all income-redistribution effects of those poli- 
cies.  Only  substitution effects  and aggregate (world) wealth  effects 
remain. Any models of fiscal policy in which income redistribution and 
the subsequent dynamics of asset accumulation play a major role are 
sensitive, therefore, to assumptions about international financial mar- 
kets. The considerations in this chapter should grow in empirical rel- 
evance as international financial markets continue to develop in breadth 
and sophistication. 
In his comments on Stockman’s paper, Andrew B. Abel analyzes a 
simplified version of one of Stockman’s models to illustrate the con- 
ditions under which international financial markets permit sharing of 
country-specific risk. Abel proceeds by analyzing the implications of 
regime changes. In this regard he illustrates Stockman’s observation 
that the effectiveness of fiscal policy depends on the degree of avail- 
ability of  insurance against various changes in policy and/or policy 
regimes. Abel  concludes his comments with an analysis of  optimal 
domestic fiscal policies in the absence of international financial markets. 
Commenting on the same paper, Patrick J. Kehoe expands on two 
main themes, stimulated by Stockman’s paper. He explores the impli- 
cations of deterministic and stochastic models for comparative-statics 
analysis, and he analyzes the implications of market completeness for 
stochastic comparative statics. 
In the seventh chapter, Linda S. Kole examines the issue of inter- 
national interdependencies in the context of fiscal policies. Her analysis 
investigates the effects of a large nation’s fiscal expansion on the real 
exchange rate, real interest rates, and the balance of payments. Within 
a two-country macroeconomic model, the initial impact, dynamic ad- 
justment  path, and long-run changes associated with an increase in 
government spending are analyzed. It is shown that the dynamic and 
steady state effects of  expansionary fiscal policy can be dramatically 
different if  one relaxes the assumption that the expanding country is 
small relative to international capital markets. Two crucial factors in 12  Jacob A. Frenkel 
determining the economic responses to fiscal policy are shown to be 
the size of initial cross-country bond holdings and the degree of sub- 
stitutability between domestic and foreign assets. 
Kole notes that most economic analyses of fiscal policy have assumed 
that the country undergoing an expansion is small in the sense that it 
faces infinitely elastic demand for its goods and assets. In this setting, 
if  international assets are close substitutes, a balanced budget increase 
in  government spending causes an initial appreciation, followed by 
gradual depreciation and decumulation of net foreign assets through a 
current account deficit caused primarily by a decline in the domestic 
trade balance. But, if  the country embarking on a balanced budget or 
bond-financed fiscal expansion is large enough on world capital markets 
to affect world interest rates, then different results may obtain. With 
a sufficiently large degree of international capital market integration or 
imperfect asset substitutability, initial appreciation may be followed by 
further appreciation,  along with  accumulation of  net  foreign assets 
mainly through persistent service account surpluses. This type of  dy- 
namic adjustment is applicable to large countries such as the United 
States, where the trade balance deficits resulting from a fiscal expansion 
may be outweighed by service account surpluses because of  the as- 
sociated increase in world interest rates over the short or medium run. 
Using a two-country model, Kole shows that the dynamic paths of 
the real exchange rate and the stock of net foreign assets between the 
time of anticipation and occurrence of a fiscal expansion depend cru- 
cially on the degree of international asset substitutability and the size 
of the expanding nation relative to world capital markets. The model 
is also used to compare the effects of tax vs. bond finance of an increase 
in  government spending. Simulations are performed  to illustrate the 
different dynamic and long-run effects associated with these two fi- 
nancing schemes. 
The chapter briefly considers the U.S. experience with large bond- 
financed deficits and  steady  real  appreciation  in  light  of  the above 
theoretical framework. Kole notes that, given the size of the U.S. fiscal 
expansion, it is not particularly surprising that we have witnessed real 
appreciation, high real interest rates, and unprecedented current ac- 
count deficits. What the author finds difficult to explain, however, is 
the precise magnitude of the changes and the pattern of events that 
occurred, especially the experience of steady appreciation along with 
a massive decumulation of net foreign assets that occurred from mid- 
1982 to the beginning of 1985. As a result, Kole concludes that other 
factors in addition to fiscal policy must have played a role in yielding 
the high world real interest rates, the strength of the dollar, and the 
deterioration of the U.S. external position. 
Commenting on Kole’s paper, Robert J. Hodrick extends the model 
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plifying assumptions.  Among the considerations  advanced by  Hod- 
rick’s analysis are: the role of stochastic elements, the role of sticky 
prices, the role of investment, capital accumulation, and the real busi- 
ness cycle, and the role of the Ricardian equivalence. 
In commenting on the same paper, Alessandro Penati remarks on 
some of the properties of the consumption function used by Kole and 
on the wealth effects induced by exchange rate changes. He expresses 
skepticism about the suitability of traditional portfolio models for the 
analysis of the evolution  of  the U.S.  current account  and the real 
exchange rate during the first half of the 1980s. 
In the eighth chapter, Sweder van Wijnbergen provides an empirical 
analysis of  the interrelations among fiscal policies, trade intervention 
and  world  interest  rates.  He develops a general equilibrium model 
designed to discuss the global effects on intertemporal and intratem- 
poral trade of various fiscal policy measures and interventions in com- 
modity trade. 
The theoretical structure suggests two tests of debt neutrality, both 
of which, when applied to OECD data, reject the debt neutrality hy- 
pothesis. These two tests are then incorporated in an empirical version 
of the theoretical model. The empirical global model has a tightly fo- 
cused structure, designed around questions concerning the impact of 
fiscal policy measures and interventions in commodity trade on inter- 
temporal and intratemporal trade patterns and relative prices. The global 
general equilibrium structure is a distinguishing feature of the model, 
with the real interest rate and the structure of the terms of  trade re- 
sulting from global current account balance and various commodity 
market-clearing conditions. Another feature that sets this model apart 
from many other empirical macromodels is its explicit incorporation 
of aggregate supply considerations. At the core of the industrial coun- 
tries bloc, finally, is an explicit analysis of  the interaction between 
private and public savings. 
In the applied part of the paper van Wijnbergen first presents data 
demonstrating that government revenues net of  social security outlays 
have remained remarkably constant as a share of national income from 
1965 right up to 1984. On the basis of this observation he believes the 
fiscal policy debate has focused too much on tax cuts and not enough 
on deficit-financed increase in  government expenditure.  The author 
then assesses the effect of this deficit-financed increase in real govern- 
ment expenditure on real interest rates by  running a simulation with 
the empirical model presented earlier under the assumption of a halving 
of that increase in government expenditure. 
The  results  show,  first  of  all,  that  fiscal policy  explains  only  a 
negligible fraction of the rapid increase in  real interest rates between 
1979 and 1982. But since 1982 almost all of the increase in real interest 
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increased fiscal expenditure and the fact that that increase was deficit- 
financed. 
In the last section van Wijnbergen discusses various trade interven- 
tions designed to reduce fiscal deficits. He points out, and documents 
empirically through  simulation runs, the importance  of  interactions 
between intertemporal and intratemporal trade. A tariff directed against 
Less Developed Countries’ (LDC) exports (along the line of proposals 
under discussion in the U.S. Congress) is shown to cause significant 
deterioration in the LDC terms of trade. This in turn leads to a signif- 
icant ex ante deterioration of the LDC’s current account without an 
offsetting ex ante improvement in the OECD current account. The net 
result is an increase in the world interest rate to restore global current 
account balance, a possibility pointed out in the theoretical section. 
The simulation exercise demonstrates the empirical importance of this 
mechanism: after imposition of a 10% tariff against LDC exports, real 
interest rates rise a full 2 percentage points initially. They are still half 
a percentage point higher after five years. Protectionism directed against 
LDCs, therefore,  not  only  shifts their intratemporal terms of  trade 
unfavorably but also causes a deterioration of their intertemporal terms 
of trade. 
In discussing van Wijnbergen’s paper, Guillermo A. Calvo notes that 
the author assumes that taxes were transitory. Calvo claims that if a 
current tax  cut induces expectations of  a future cut in  government 
spending then current consumption would depend positively on fiscal 
deficits. Accordingly, Calvo questions the robustness of the procedure 
employed in testing the Ricardian equivalence. In addition he indicates 
the desirability of a detailed theoretical specification of the assumptions 
regarding capital mobility and the type of assets available to portfolio 
holders. 
Commenting on the same paper, John T.  Cuddington proposes that 
a more refined aggregation of countries would reveal insightful effects 
of intra-OECD differences. He then raises several measurement issues 
related to “inflation-adjusted’’ deficit, “full employment” deficit, and 
the treatment of transfer payments. Cuddington believes that while the 
paper explains why real interest rates stayed high in the early 1980s, 
it does not provide an explanation of why these rates rose in the first 
place. For this he believes that one needs to recognize the role played 
by monetary policy. 
In the ninth chapter, Kent P.  Kimbrough provides an analysis of 
optimal tax policy for balance of payments objectives. He notes that 
much work has been done in international economics on the proper 
role of tax policy in open economies. One major strand of this literature 
deals with the optimal use of taxes to offset distortions and to achieve 
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this literature is that in both instances the optimal policy requires di- 
rectly influencing the relevant marginal rate of substitution or marginal 
rate of transformation. The literature on the optimum structure of tax- 
ation for attaining noneconomic objectives has focused exclusively on 
microeconomic goals such as a target level of output in a certain sector 
of  the economy or target levels for imports and exports. Yet,  many 
practical policy questions concern the use of  tax policy for attaining 
various macroeconomic objectives. For example, the most pervasive 
and persistent argument for tariffs and other impediments to interna- 
tional trade in goods and assets is that such policies are useful devices 
for coping with balance of  payments or trade balance difficulties. The 
recent large U.S. trade balance deficits and the policies suggested to 
remedy them attest to the fact that such protectionist sentiments are 
alive and well today. 
With this background Kimbrough examines, from the perspective of 
the literature on noneconomic objectives, the optimal tax policies for 
achieving various balance-of-payments-related  objectives. The aim is 
to provide a general welfare theoretic framework for studying optimal 
policies concerning balance of payments and other international finance 
related objectives. Kimbrough considers a general equilibrium model 
of a monetary economy, and uses the cash-in-advance,  exchange econ- 
omy setup extended to a two-good, production economy. The resulting 
framework is used to characterize the optimal tax structure for four 
balance-of-payments-related  objectives: a trade balance target, a wealth 
target, an international reserve target, and a balance of payments target. 
The optimal tax policies for attaining trade balance and wealth targets 
are quite similar, the latter being the stock accumulated through the 
flows associated with the former. A  key feature of  the optimal tax 
structures for these goals is that within-period consumption and pro- 
duction decisions are left undistorted (i.e., marginal rates of  substi- 
tution and transformation between goods at a point in time are set equal 
to the world relative price). In both instances the objective is optimally 
achieved by  levying a tax on international borrowing. The intuition 
here is straightforward: trade balance targets and wealth targets can 
both be attained by an appropriate shifting of  intertemporal consump- 
tion patterns. It is therefore optimal to put into place a tax structure 
that strikes directly at intertemporal relative prices while leaving within- 
period relative prices undistorted. This rules out traditional import 
substitution and export promotion strategies, both of  which drive a 
wedge between domestic and world within-period relative prices, as 
part of the optimal tax package for achieving trade balance and wealth 
targets. The main  difference between the optimal policies for trade 
balance and wealth targets is shown to be the time profile of  taxes on 
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ance targets calls for a tax on international borrowing that varies over 
time while a wealth target calls for a tax on international borrowing 
that is constant across periods. Kimbrough also points out that, as an 
empirical matter, from  the viewpoint  of  the permanent  income hy- 
pothesis,  the enactment of  such policies will result  in  consumption 
exhibiting what appears to be excess sensitivity to current income. 
The optimal policies for the other two objectives that are studied by 
Kimbrough, an international reserve target and a balance of payments 
target, also have much in common with one another. In both instances 
the first-best policy is to devalue or cut back on domestic credit cre- 
ation. This follows from the fact that, as a consequence of Ricardian 
equivalence, exchange rate management policies have no real effects. 
Hence undertaking  such policies  does not  reduce  welfare  from  its 
distortion-free level. Kimbrough notes that despite advice along these 
lines from economists,  countries  experiencing  balance of  payments 
difficulties often resort to tariffs,  export subsidies, and other trade 
interventions. A practical question then concerns the optimal tax pol- 
icy, i.e., the second-best policy, for achieving an international reserve 
target or a balance  of payments target.  With money  holdings being 
motivated by the cash-in-advance constraint, the demand for money, 
whose intertemporal behavior is fundamental for the balance of pay- 
ments,  is  simply the value  of  domestic output at consumer prices. 
Hence the optimal tax policy for building up international reserves 
through an improved balance of payments calls, when starting from an 
initial steady-state equilibrium,  for a  set of  consumption taxes and 
production subsidies to increase the demand for money. Therefore, 
unlike the optimal policies for trade balance and wealth targets, those 
for international reserve and balance of payments objectives can be 
structured to include tariffs, export subsidies, or equivalent trade in- 
terventions that introduce a wedge between domestic and world within- 
period relative prices. Additionally, the optimal tax structure also calls 
for a supporting set of subsidies to international borrowing so as to 
shift consumption toward those periods when it is taxed most heavily 
and thereby minimize the associated welfare loss. 
In commenting on Kimbrough’s paper, Joshua Aizenman extends 
the analytical framework by  allowing for departures from Ricardian 
assumptions. He discusses Kimbrough’s methodology as well as the 
specification of the cash-in-advance formulation underlying the mon- 
letary sector. Aizenman casts Kimbrough’s analysis in  terms of  the 
traditional analysis of commercial policies; he examines the implica- 
tions of limited access to capital markets and allows for the possibilities 
(of cost of tax collection and revenue targets. 
In commenting on the same paper, Robert G. Murphy focuses on 
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analysis and identifies the circumstances under which the main results 
are robust with respect to alternative specifications of the monetary 
sector. In this regard he notes that the choice of optimal policies aimed 
at the overall balance-of-payments target depends critically on the spec- 
ification of the monetary mechanism. 
The tenth chapter, by Lawrence H. Summers, concludes the volume. 
This chapter focuses on tax policy and international competitiveness. 
The author notes that international considerations are coming to play 
an increasingly important role in U.S.  tax policy debates. Policy dis- 
cussions of tax provisions bearing on foreign investment in the United 
States and American investment abroad have long focused on the com- 
petitiveness question. He notes that recently general reductions in taxes 
on business investment have been advocated on the grounds that they 
will  increase American  competitiveness.  Excessive tax burdens  are 
frequently  blamed  for the  poor international performance  of  some 
American industries. Indeed the President’s Commission on Interna- 
tional Competitiveness recently urged business tax relief as a major 
element in  strategy directed at improving the trade position  of  the 
United States. Tax increases to reduce looming budget deficits are often 
defended on the grounds that they will reduce trade deficits. 
Against this background Summers provides an analysis of the impact 
of tax policy on international competitiveness, stressing the crucial role 
of  capital mobility in determining  the impact  of tax reforms on an 
economy’s trading goods sector. He begins by examining theoretically 
the relationship between tax changes and competitiveness under the 
assumption of perfect international capital mobility. This common as- 
sumption of free international capital mobility leads to striking conclu- 
sions regarding the short-run impact of tax policies. Tax measures that 
stimulate investment but do not affect savings will inevitably lead to 
declines in international competitiveness as long as capital is freely 
mobile internationally. Measures that promote investment attract funds 
from abroad, leading to appreciation in the real exchange rate and a 
reduction in the competitiveness of domestic industry. The accounting 
identity holding that the current account equals the difference between 
national savings and national investment insures that increases in in- 
vestment ceteris paribus will be associated with decreases in the trade 
balance. Conversely, tax policies that promote savings and do not have 
a direct impact on investment will improve trade performance. 
According to Summers, these results challenge the commonly ex- 
pressed view that reductions in tax burdens on business will improve 
competitiveness by enabling business to undertake more productivity- 
enhancing investments. They also raise an  interesting question in political 
economy. Why do firms in the trading goods sector, whose competi- 
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incentives, lobby in favor of them? Consideration of this question leads 
naturally to an examination of the premise of free international capital 
mobility, which underlies the arguments in the previous paragraph. If 
capital is not internationally  mobile, stimulus to investment will not 
lead to capital inflows and therefore will not be associated with trade 
balance deterioration.  While there certainly is a large pool of inter- 
nationally mobile capital, Martin Feldstein has pointed to an important 
puzzle raised by the hypothesis of  international capital mobility. This 
hypothesis predicts  that there  should be no systematic relationship 
between domestic saving and investment rates so that the capital can 
flow freely. Yet  looking across the OECD nations, there is in fact a 
very strong positive correlation between savings and investment rates. 
Over a long period  of  time, cumulative current account deficits or 
surpluses are quite small despite large variations in domestic savings 
rates. On a very consistent basis, high savings countries are also high 
investment countries while low savings countries like the United States 
have relatively low rates of  investment. 
The high correlation between domestic savings and investment rates 
raises difficult issues of interpretation. It can be argued that the high 
correlation suggests that it is likely to be impossible for tax policies to 
change domestic savings or investment in isolation without affecting 
the other quantity. Alternatively, some argue that the high correlation 
between domestic savings and investment rates is spurious, reflecting 
the impact of third factors.  Yet  another possibility is that capital is 
freely mobile across international borders but that nations consistently 
pursue policies which drive capital, saving, and investment into bal- 
ance. These hypotheses have very different implications for interna- 
tional tax policies. Summers assesses the evidence on each of them 
and concludes that the maintained external balance hypothesis holding 
that national savings and investment rates are highly correlated because 
of policy actions by countries probably is the most important empirically. 
This finding raises important questions. Given that policies to limit 
net capital mobility are frequently pursued, how should the effects of 
tax policy reforms which affect savings or investment be evaluated? 
Summers notes that if no other policy measures are undertaken, their 
effects should be analyzed under the assumption that capital is perfectly 
normal. Historical record suggests that current account imbalances are 
likely to be offset by other policy actions. Is this use of obvious rel- 
evance to the current American situation of business tax reductions, 
a period that has stimulated a significant amount of capital formation 
and drawn capital in from abroad in large quantity, but where the trade 
deficit is largely seen as the major problem? 
In commenting on Summers’s paper, Jeffrey A. Frankel reviews the 
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and investment and comments on some of the econometric procedures 
adopted by Summers. He then makes the central point that such cor- 
relations do not provide useful information concerning the degree of 
international capital mobility. The latter should be analyzed by inter- 
national comparisons among expected real rates of return. 
Commenting on the same paper, Roger H. Gordon proposes an al- 
ternative model that predicts a close association between savings and 
investment even in  the absence of  government restrictions on capital 
mobility. Moreover, in Gordon’s framework such restrictions are de- 
sirable on welfare grounds. This Page Intentionally Left Blank